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We investigate the economic consequences of the Basel III requirement to include unrealized fair 
value gains and losses on available-for-sale (AFS) securities in regulatory capital. Using data for 
U.S. banks we find negative market reactions around news indicating an increased likelihood of 
this regulatory change being implemented, consistent with increased regulatory costs. We also 
find that banks affected by this regulation reduce their investment in risky AFS securities relative 
to unaffected banks. This result suggests that extending the use of fair values for regulatory 
purposes reduces ex ante risk taking.   
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We examine the economic consequences of the implementation of a particular provision 
of Basel III in the U.S. that requires the inclusion of unrealized fair value gains and losses on 
investment securities in regulatory capital. Given the large size of interest rate sensitive assets 
in banks’ investment portfolios, this requirement significantly increases the importance of fair 
value accounting for regulatory purposes. This regulatory choice involves an important trade-
off. On the one hand, fair values introduce volatility into regulatory capital that might unduly 
result in regulatory intervention. On the other hand, fair value-based capital adequacy 
requirements might reduce managerial incentives to take excessive risks (Dewatripont and 
Tirole, 1994). We empirically investigate this trade-off by analyzing stock market reactions 
and banks’ investment behavior around the events leading up to this regulatory change. 
Under the previous U.S. regulatory capital guidelines, unrealized fair value gains and 
losses on available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities were filtered out of Tier 1 capital, which is 
commonly referred to as the “Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) filter.”1 In 
June 2012, regulators issued three notices of proposed rulemaking (hereafter referred to as the 
“Proposal”), which, besides significant changes in the calculation of regulatory capital and 
risk weightings, proposed the removal of the AOCI filter for all banks subject to the new 
regulatory framework.2 Many market observers regarded “...the removal of the AOCI filter 
...[as] the biggest single issue the industry is lobbying over in terms of financial regulation.”3 
Following significant opposition from banks, the Final Rule, issued on July 2, 2013, includes 
an opt-out provision for non-advanced approaches banks (i.e., generally banks with an asset 
size less than $250 billion) to make a one-time, irreversible election to continue with the 
                                                 
1  To be precise, AOCI also includes unrealized gains and losses on cash flow hedges, foreign currency 
translation adjustments, and employee benefit plan adjustments. However, for most sample banks the 
magnitude of these adjustments is negligible compared to the magnitude of unrealized gains and losses on 
available-for-sale securities. 
2  All banks with total assets greater than $500 million were subject to the proposed rules. 
3  See the article in Risk magazine, “Banks fear capital swings if Basel III kills bond filter,” from March 04, 
2013, citing Peter Sime, Head of Risk and Research at the International Swaps and Derivatives Association. 
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previous regulatory treatment of unrealized gains and losses. If they do not elect to opt out, 
they will be required to include the AOCI in regulatory capital from January 1, 2015. In 
contrast, advanced approaches banks (generally banks with an asset size greater than $250 
billion) cannot opt out and have to include unrealized gains and losses in regulatory capital 
from January 1, 2014.  
Banking industry representatives such as the ABA (2012) argue that the removal of the 
AOCI filter is likely to increase regulatory capital volatility that is not reflective of banks’ 
true economic risk. In rising interest rate environments unrealized fair value losses on AFS 
securities can result in a substantial hit to banks’ Tier 1 capital because offsetting economic 
gains on the liability side are not recognized. As a consequence, banks may be considered less 
than well-capitalized by the market and regulators.4 Anticipating the regulatory capital effects 
arising from the removal of the AOCI filter, banks may hold fewer interest rate sensitive 
assets or invest in securities with shorter maturities. Given that banks are important investors 
in long-term government and agency securities, this might heavily affect trading in these 
markets. Alternatively, banks may reclassify bonds from AFS to held-to-maturity (HTM) so 
that temporary changes in fair values are not recognized. However, because HTM bonds 
generally cannot be sold without tainting banks’ HTM portfolios, banks’ flexibility to use 
such securities for liquidity management would be reduced. Ultimately, this might affect their 
ability to lend.5 
In contrast, regulators argue that the removal of the AOCI filter results in a regulatory 
framework that is more reflective of banks’ risk, particularly credit risk. Indeed, in the fourth 
                                                 
4  A simulation exercise of the ABA (2012, p. A-8) indicates that if the AOCI filter were removed, a number of 
U.S. banks could fall below the well-capitalized standard in a rising interest rate environment.  
5  For example, banks might reduce loan commitments extended to firms because they are less able to provide 
liquidity on demand when firms draw on the loan (Kashyap et al., 2002). 
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quarter of 2008, the ten largest banks6 in our sample accumulated $35.3 billion of unrealized 
losses on their AFS securities, primarily due to changes in credit spreads, that were not 
reflected in their Tier 1 capital.7 While this preferential regulatory treatment might have 
prevented banks from breaching regulatory thresholds ex post, it also potentially provided ex 
ante incentives for banks to invest in illiquid AFS securities with higher credit risk, which are 
the key source of procyclical asset declines. This argument is consistent with theoretical 
studies showing that historical cost-based capital requirements induce risk-shifting behavior 
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Lu et al., 2012). In turn, extending the use of fair values in 
regulatory capital calculations would mitigate risk-shifting incentives ex ante and improve 
regulatory discipline. Moreover, the countercyclical behavior of interest rates can have a 
further regulatory benefit. Specifically, since interest rates tend to fall in bad times, 
corresponding fair value gains could dampen the impact of falling asset prices. In good times, 
unrealized fair value losses due to the rise in interest rates can limit the risk-taking ability of 
banks (e.g., Xie, 2015). 
We investigate whether these potential economic costs and benefits are reflected in stock 
market participants’ expectations and bank managers’ investment behavior. We start by 
examining stock market reactions to pronouncements leading up to the passage of the Final 
Rule. The sign and magnitude of capital market reactions will depend on the perceived 
likelihood that the Final Rule will be implemented and the trade-off between the perceived 
benefits of greater regulatory discipline in bank risk taking and the associated costs of the 
potentially higher likelihood of regulatory intervention. To the extent that investors perceive 
the removal of the AOCI filter, on average as costly, we should observe negative (positive) 
                                                 
6  The top ten banks represent about 82 percent of total assets in our sample. 
7   On average, unrealized fair value losses represented 10.4% of Top 10 banks’ Tier 1 capital. For example, 
Citigroup reported an unrealized loss of $9.6 billion on AFS securities representing 8.1% of its Tier 1 capital. 
State Street Corporation’s unrealized loss amounted to $5.2 billion or 36.9% of its Tier 1 capital. Only 
SunTrust banks had an unrealized gain of $0.9 billion (5% of Tier 1 capital). 
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market reactions to events that increase (decrease) the likelihood of inclusion of AFS fair 
value gains and losses in regulatory capital. A key challenge of examining the economic 
consequences of any regulation using stock market reactions is to control for concurrent 
confounding events (e.g., Leuz 2007). In addition, our study faces the issue that the Final Rule 
was discussed and passed as a package, which makes it difficult to separate the effects of a 
particular provision. We address this issue in four ways: First, to control for general trends 
affecting the U.S. financial industry, we benchmark stock market reactions of banks to those 
of insurance companies, which also hold significant amounts of AFS securities but are 
unaffected by the regulation. Second, we compare abnormal returns of advanced approaches 
banks with non-advanced approaches banks on the Final Rule date, when only advanced 
approaches banks were affected by the mandatory AOCI filter removal, but other aspects of 
the regulation remained similar for the two groups of banks. Third, we undertake a cross-
sectional analysis to examine whether observed market reactions can be specifically attributed 
to the removal of the AOCI filter. Finally, to mitigate the concern that any cross-sectional 
findings are due to omitted correlated variables, we perform a bootstrapping analysis to 
benchmark our test results against results obtained on randomly selected non-event days.   
Next, we study whether banks change their investment behavior in anticipation of the 
implementation of the Final Rule. Specifically, we examine whether banks reduce the 
maturity of their investment securities and the relative amount of their total securities 
classified as AFS, as argued by bank representatives. In addition, we test whether the use of 
fair value in regulatory capital calculations results in the reduction of banks’ ex ante risk 
taking as predicted by theoretical literature (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Lu et al., 2012). 
To this end, we examine whether banks reduce the level of illiquid assets in the AFS portfolio 
in anticipation of the AOCI filter removal. We choose illiquid assets because they tend to be 
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riskier than the bulk of the AFS portfolio consisting of Treasury bonds and agency-backed 
securities.8 
Our setting is particularly conducive to investigating changes in banks' investment 
behavior. Specifically, we exploit the fact that the Proposal to remove the AOCI filter issued 
in June 2012 would have affected all banks (total assets greater than $500 million), while the 
Final Rule issued in July 2013 provides an opt-out option for non-advanced approaches 
banks.9 In addition, small banks (total assets less than $500 million) are not affected by any 
Basel III regulation. As a result, we have three groups of banks that are differently affected by 
the Proposal’s and Final Rule’s provisions regarding the removal of the AOCI filter. This 
allows us to utilize a differences-in-differences approach to compare changes in investment 
behavior for these three groups at different points in time.  
We find statistically significant and negative (positive) market reactions to news that 
increased (decreased) the likelihood of AOCI filter removal, consistent with investors 
perceiving this regulatory provision as costly. In contrast, we do not find similar market 
reactions for insurance companies. We also observe a significantly stronger (positive) market 
reaction for non-advanced approaches banks than for advanced approaches banks around the 
Final Rule issue date. Furthermore, we find that market reactions are primarily associated 
with the magnitude of unrealized gains and losses on the AFS portfolio of banks. Our 
bootstrapping analysis suggests that this association is unique to our identified events. 
Collectively, these results give us confidence that the observed stock market reactions are 
driven by the AOCI filter removal and not by other confounding events. 
                                                 
8  Illiquid AFS securities usually include complex structured investments such as collateralized debt or loan 
obligations, non-agency mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities.  
9  Non-advanced approaches banks have to make the AOCI filter opt-out election when they file the Call 
Report or FR Y-9 report for the first reporting period after the date upon which they become subject to the 




Second, using quarterly data for U.S. banks in the period from 2009 to 2014, we find no 
evidence that advanced and non-advanced approaches banks decrease the maturity of their 
investment portfolio and the proportion of investment securities classified as AFS, in the 
Proposal or Final Rule periods relative to the benchmark group. Interestingly, advanced and 
non-advanced approaches banks significantly reduce the proportion of illiquid (Level 3 fair 
valued) assets in their AFS portfolio in the Proposal period, when both groups of banks would 
have been affected by the AOCI filter removal. However, in the Final Rule period the initial 
reduction of Level 3 AFS securities is partially reversed for the non-advanced approaches 
banks, when the AOCI filter removal was turned into an option for these banks. In contrast, 
advanced approaches banks experience a further decrease in illiquid investment securities in 
the Final Rule period. In additional analyses using hand-collected data for a subset of banks, 
we find that these trends are driven by real investment decisions related to changes in net 
purchases of Level 3 securities. Finally, we do not find a similar decrease in the proportion of 
Level 3 trading securities for advanced approaches banks, mitigating the concern that the risk 
reduction in their AFS portfolio is driven by other concurrent regulations affecting 
systematically important banks. Taken together, our results suggest that banks reduced their 
exposure to riskier illiquid assets in response to the expected removal of the AOCI filter.  
We contribute to extant literature by providing empirical evidence on the merits of the 
extended use of fair values in regulatory accounting. Our analyses of stock market reactions 
suggest that investors perceive the extension of regulatory fair value accounting as increasing 
regulatory costs. To the extent that the observed market reactions are capturing the increased 
likelihood of (undue) regulatory intervention, shareholder losses might be indicative of 
potential social welfare costs. However, combined with the finding of reduced bank risk 
taking, our capital market results are also consistent with a reduction in the put option value 
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provided by deposit insurance, and thus, wealth transfers from shareholders to depositors. Our 
tests cannot distinguish between these two non-mutually exclusive explanations. Specifically, 
changes in security prices primarily reflect the private costs and benefits of individual 
investors, but may not fully capture the social costs and benefits of this regulatory change. 
Further, our findings inform the debate among regulators and researchers over whether 
capital adequacy calculations should be based on fair values (e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole, 
1994; Allen and Carletti, 2008; Plantin et al., 2008). Extant empirical research has largely 
focused on the potentially detrimental ex post effects of fair value accounting on 
procyclicality and contagion (e.g., Khan, 2010; Bhat et al., 2011). A recent exception is Ellul 
et al. (2014), which shows that the use of fair values in statutory accounting reduces ex ante 
risk-taking incentives in insurance firms. However, the authors caution that their results might 
not be generalizable to the banking industry because of institutional aspects such as ‘too big 
to fail’.  We follow the call of Acharya and Ryan (2016) to explore the link between fair value 
accounting and risk-taking in the banking setting and complement Ellul et al. (2014) by 
showing that fair value-based capital requirements mitigate the ex ante risk-taking incentives 
of banks. Moreover, we document that banks change their risk-taking behavior even before 
the fair value requirements become effective.  
Interestingly, our results differ from the findings of two prior studies examining the 
investment behavior of banks around a similar change in accounting. Beatty (1995) and 
Hodder et al. (2002) find evidence that banks change both the proportion of investment 
securities and the maturity of investment securities around the adoption of SFAS 115.10 
However, because SFAS 115 affected all banks, the lack of a valid control group in these 
studies makes it difficult to control for potential time confounding effects. In our setting, we 
                                                 
10  SFAS 115 was introduced in 1994 and required previously disclosed unrealized fair value gains and losses on 
AFS securities to be recognized in accounting equity. 
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can exploit the fact that some firms are completely unaffected by the AOCI provision or can 
opt out, which allows us to examine the effects of alternative regulatory accounting regimes 
on banks’ investment behavior.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 delineates the accounting and the regulatory 
treatment of unrealized fair value gains and losses on AFS securities and describes the events 
leading up to the passage of the Final Rule. Section 3 discusses the implications of the 
removal of the AOCI filter and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes our sample. 
Section 5 details our empirical approach and provides our main empirical findings. Section 6 
discusses some limitations of our analyses and concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Accounting for investment securities  
Before FASB Staff Position (FSP) FAS 115-2 and FAS 124-2 
Banks hold a significant amount of investment securities primarily for the purposes of 
interest rate risk and liquidity management (e.g., Beatty, 1995).11 Under Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 115, investment securities that are not held for 
trading can be classified as held-to-maturity (HTM) or available for sale (AFS). Debt 
securities may only be classified as HTM if the bank has the positive intent and ability to hold 
those securities until maturity. HTM securities are recognized at amortized cost with fair 
values only disclosed in the footnotes. A feature of this category is that sales of HTM 
securities before maturity are restricted to certain circumstances.12 Any sales that do not fall 
into the “rare event” category would call into question (“taint”) the classification as HTM and 
                                                 
11  Investment securities generally comprise highly liquid marketable securities such as instruments issued by 
the U.S. government and its agencies, but also mortgage-backed securities and, to some extent, equity 
securities. 
12  For example, when there is a significant deterioration of the issuer’s creditworthiness or changes in 
regulations that significantly affect the banks’ original intent or ability to hold these securities until maturity. 
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could necessitate the transfer of all HTM securities to AFS. The restrictive nature of the HTM 
category is probably the reason why banks classify only a small proportion of investment 
securities as HTM.13 AFS securities are measured at fair value with any unrealized fair value 
gains and losses directly recognized in equity as part of the other comprehensive income 
(OCI). Unrealized fair value losses on HTM and AFS securities only affect income if they are 
considered other-than-temporary, meaning that there is significant doubt that the firm has the 
intent or ability to hold the security until the recovery of its amortized cost basis. 
 
After FASB Staff Position (FSP) FAS 115-2 and FAS 124-2 
During the recent Financial Crisis, bankers complained that SFAS 115 forced them to 
recognize excessive other-than-temporary impairments (OTTIs) that were triggered by 
illiquidity in the debt markets and not by a decline in expected cash flows.14 Pressured by 
Congress the FASB issued a FASB Staff Position (FSP) that amends the impairment related 
provision of SFAS 115 (Pulliam and McGinty, 2009). According to the FSP, only the credit 
loss portion of OTTIs has to be recognized in income, which refers to the difference between 
the amortized cost and the present value of expected cash flows that the firm does not expect 
to collect until the maturity of the security. OTTIs related to all other factors are recognized in 
OCI for both HTM and AFS securities (FSP FAS 115-2 and FAS 124-2). However, 
temporary fair value changes due to changes in liquidity, interest rates, or credit spreads must 
be recognized in OCI only for AFS securities. These amendments became effective in the 
second quarter of 2009. 
                                                 
13  Evans et al. (2014) report that HTM securities declined from 15.0 percent to 1.8 percent of total assets 
between 1994 and 2007. 
14  Bankers’ claims were somewhat misguided, since under previous SFAS 115 rules OTTIs could not be 
triggered due to illiquidity unless the bank could not hold the securities until the recovery of the amortized 
cost basis. Once triggered, however, the OTTI would be affected by any market illiquidity to the extent 




2.2. Regulatory treatment of fair value gains and losses on available-for-sale securities 
Bank regulators’ main objective is to ensure financial stability and to protect the interests 
of depositors who lack the incentives to monitor banks. By imposing minimum capital 
requirements that are sensitive to the risk of banks’ assets, regulators attempt to reduce banks’ 
excessive risk taking. Specifically, capital regulations induce bank owners to raise capital 
when they invest in riskier assets (Kim and Santomero, 1988). Bank regulators use accounting 
equity to determine regulatory capital. However, to better serve the prudential role of 
regulatory capital, regulators apply so-called prudential filters to adjust accounting amounts. 
For example, they exclude goodwill and unrealized gains of fair valued liabilities that result 
from a deterioration of the banks’ own credit risk.  
Similarly, under previous regulations fair value changes on AFS debt securities were 
excluded from the calculation of regulatory capital. Losses on AFS debt securities affected 
regulatory capital only when they were realized through impairment or sale. The original 
motivation behind this prudential treatment was to exclude (presumably temporary) 
unrealized fair value changes on AFS debt securities that were irrelevant for regulatory 
purposes if banks held the securities until maturity (Laux, 2012). Indeed, during the financial 
crisis this favorable regulatory treatment acted as a safeguard by shielding banks’ regulatory 
capital from unrealized losses on AFS debt securities (Laux and Leuz, 2010; Badertscher et 
al., 2012).  
However, while temporary price distortions due to illiquidity in markets might not be 
important if a bank can hold on to the assets, they can be very relevant when banks are likely 
to be forced to sell these assets (Laux, 2012). In addition, by not including fair value changes 
in regulatory capital, the regulator effectively treats AFS securities as if they were accounted 
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at historical cost, where deterioration of underlying asset values does not lead to a transfer of 
control. As a result, the solvency constraint has less bite, which creates strong incentives for 
asset substitution (Lu et al., 2012). Moreover, in economic downturns this regulatory 
treatment provides banks with incentives to retain illiquid troubled assets, rather than to sell 
them early (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2011). Hence, while ex post prudential filters might 
dampen the impact of fair value losses on regulatory capital, ex ante they provide adverse 
incentives for excessive risk taking at the expense of deposit insurance funds and ultimately 
taxpayers. Regulators have recognized this problem, and new regulations require the inclusion 
of unrealized gains and losses on AFS debt securities in regulatory capital, as outlined in the 
next section (BCBS, 2011; Final Rule, 2013). 
 
2.3. Events leading up to the removal of the AOCI filter 
The pertinent events leading to the publication of the Final Rule are shown in Table 1. In 
Table 1 we classify these events based on whether they increase or decrease the likelihood 
that the removal of the AOCI filter will be implemented in the Final Rule. On December 16, 
2010, the Basel Committee issued details of the Basel III regulatory framework, which was 
hailed as “a landmark achievement that will help protect financial stability and promote 
sustainable economic growth” (BCBS, 2010). A main objective of Basel III is “to raise both 
the quantity and the quality of the regulatory capital base” (BCBS, 2010, paragraphs 7-9). 
Paragraph 52 of Basel III lists what banks must include in common equity Tier I capital.15 
One of these items is AOCI, which primarily comprises unrealized gains and losses on AFS 
                                                 
15  Basel III breaks Tier 1 capital into Common Equity Tier 1 capital and Additional Tier 1 capital. The former 
is considered the highest quality capital and banks are required to maintain a Common Equity Tier 1 capital 
of at least 4.5%. Total Tier 1 capital is required to be above 6%. 
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securities.16 The final Basel III regulatory framework, which maintained the provision 
regarding the inclusion of AOCI, was issued on June 1, 2011 (BCBS, 2011). Several 
organizations expressed concerns about the potential detrimental effect of this provision amid 
fears that it would be incorporated into U.S. rules implementing the Basel III framework (e.g., 
The Clearing House, 2011). We analyze the capital market reactions to these two events 
because investors likely had similar concerns around these dates. 
Indeed, on June 7, 2012 the Federal Reserve published three notices of proposed 
rulemaking (NPR)17, which proposed the removal of the AOCI filter for all banks subject to 
the Basel III regulatory framework, and it invited interested parties to submit comments by 
September 7, 2012. Just a month after publication, however, the comment period was 
extended to October 22, 2012 “to allow interested persons more time to understand, evaluate, 
and prepare comments” on the Proposal (Federal Reserve, 2012). A news article by SNL 
Financial (Event no. 5) attributes the decision to extend the comment period to the sheer 
number of comment letters received by regulators. In particular, the article mentions the 
comment letter submitted by ISDA in which they note that “the AOCI provision would bring 
the unintended consequences of increased volatility and pro-cyclicality into capital 
requirements” (Stovall, 2012). Such concern was shared by Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the 
Currency at an American Bankers Association (ABA) convention, who promised to carefully 
evaluate the impact that the AOCI filter removal would have on community banks (Event no. 
6). 
                                                 
16  Unrealized gains and losses on cash flow hedges are also included in AOCI, but they continue to be excluded 
from the calculation of regulatory capital. 
17  The three NPRs were: 1) Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, 
Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, and Transition Provisions; 2) Regulatory Capital 
Rules: Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets; Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements; 
and 3) Regulatory Capital Rules: advanced Approaches Risk-based Capital Rule; Market Risk Capital Rule. 
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Concerns about the possible impact of the implementation of the published NPRs18 led 
the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and the OCC to issue a joint press release in which they advised 
interested parties that the NPRs would not be implemented by the previously published 
effective date of January 1, 2013 (Event no. 7). Notwithstanding the end of the NPR comment 
period and the delay in the issue of the Final Rule implementing the NPRs, many industry 
representatives continued to lobby against the AOCI filter removal.19 In February 2013, 
Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo was summoned to a U.S. Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs meeting to update the Committee on Wall Street 
reforms and consumer protections. During the hearing, Tarullo explained that the Federal 
Reserve received over 2,000 comment letters on the NPRs, most of which focused on the 
extent to which provisions such as the removal of the AOCI filter would be burdensome for 
small and community banks (Event no. 10).20 
The Federal Reserve issued the Final Rule (Federal Reserve, 2013), which removes the 
AOCI filter for advanced approaches banks and gives a one-time option to non-advanced 
approaches banks to opt-in or out of the AOCI filter, on July 2, 2013 (Event no. 12).  
<<Insert Table 1 around here>> 
In Table 1, each news event is indicated as either increasing or decreasing the likelihood 
of the AOCI filter removal. News events reporting opposition to or delays in the 
implementation of the proposed rule are deemed to decrease the likelihood of AOCI filter 
                                                 
18  In particular, the concern related to the proposal to remove the AOCI filter. 
19  These included Independent Community Bankers of America (Events no. 8 and no. 11) and insurer-owned 
banks (Event no. 9). 
20  The dates attributed to Event no. 6 and Event no. 10 pertain to news articles summarizing events that took 
place prior to the date of these articles. Even though we were not able to identify news about these events 
prior to the dates of these news articles, we re-run all the analyses documented in the study after dropping 
Event no. 6 and Event no. 10 to ensure that our results are not driven by possible news event date 




removal. Conversely, events that indicate progress in the implementation of the Basel III 
requirements are deemed to increase the likelihood of AOCI filter removal. 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
3.1. Capital market reactions 
We start by examining the stock market reactions to news events leading up to the 
announcement of the Final Rule. As mentioned above, market reactions to these news events 
depend on the likelihood that the rule would be implemented and the trade-off between the 
perceived benefits of greater regulatory discipline in bank risk taking and the associated costs 
of the potentially higher likelihood of regulatory intervention. The first-order effect of the 
AOCI filter removal lies in the recognition of accumulated unrealized fair value gains and 
losses at the adoption date of the regulation. While this one-time effect likely was 
incorporated into market participants’ and bank managements’ expectations, we argue that the 
effects of the AOCI filter removal on the future volatility of fair values and regulatory capital 
are more important.21 Supporting this conjecture, all news articles and bank comment letters 
addressing the AOCI filter removal indicate that the primary concern is the increased 
volatility and not the one-time effect on regulatory capital. 
Since the bulk of the AFS portfolio consists of liquid, high quality, interest rate sensitive 
investment securities, changes in interest rates are the primary source of volatility in the fair 
values of these securities. This incremental volatility should increase the likelihood of 
regulatory intervention in good times, when rising interest rates result in unrealized fair value 
losses on AFS securities that are not offset by unrealized gains on economically matched 
deposit liabilities. To reduce volatility from changes in interest rates, banks could shorten the 
maturity of their investments, reclassify AFS securities to HTM, or change the nature of their 
                                                 
21  See Beatty et al. (1996) for a similar argument.  
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hedging activities.22 Both the anticipated increase in the volatility of regulatory capital and 
real actions to mitigate this volatility would impose costs on banks and, in turn, negatively 
affect firm value. 
Banks also hold illiquid AFS securities that expose them to procyclical changes in credit 
spreads that can significantly impact regulatory capital, especially during downturns, as 
evidenced during the recent Financial Crisis. To reduce this source of volatility, bank 
managers might be induced to limit their exposure to credit risk in their AFS portfolios. To 
the extent that investors expect the removal of the AOCI filter to limit excessive risk-taking, 
we expect to observe positive market reactions. However, because of their limited liability 
and the put option value provided by deposit insurance, investors might benefit from banks’ 
risk taking. In this case, we would expect negative market reactions.  
Overall, ex ante it is difficult to determine the sign and the magnitude of the net benefits 
of the regulatory change from the investors’ perspective. Two recent studies find that 
relaxation of fair value accounting rules, and thus of regulatory constraints, led to positive 
stock market reactions during the financial crisis (Bischof et al., 2014; Bowen and Khan, 
2014). This evidence suggests that investors might perceive the costs associated with 
regulatory intervention to outweigh the benefits of greater regulatory discipline. To the extent 
that the regulatory cost hypothesis holds, we expect market participants to negatively 
(positively) view events that increase (decrease) the likelihood of AOCI filter removal. Thus, 
our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: There is a negative (positive) market reaction to events that increase (decrease) 
the likelihood of AOCI filter removal. 
                                                 
22   Banks could use other hedging instruments such as interest rate swaps, collars, and floors because changes in 
the value of cash-flow hedges are still filtered out of the AOCI under the Final Rule. However, these 
instruments are more expensive to implement, potentially less predictable as a hedge, and would require 
clearing. Moreover, only very large banks would have access to such derivative markets. 
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3.2. Changes in investment behavior 
Capital market reactions at least partly reflect market participants’ expectation of changes 
in banks’ investment behavior in anticipation of the higher probability of regulatory 
intervention under fair value-based capital requirements. Two earlier studies provide evidence 
that banks altered their investment strategy in response to the (potential) impact of partial fair 
value accounting on the volatility of accounting equity, as a result of SFAS 115 adoption. 
Beatty (1995) examines the change in investment behavior of bank holding companies that 
early adopted SFAS 115 versus that of regular adopters. The study finds a decrease in both 
the proportion of assets held in investment securities and the maturity of investment securities 
held by early adopters. Beatty (1995) attributes this finding to the early adopters’ expectation 
that regulatory capital would be affected. Ultimately, regulators decided not to include 
unrealized fair value gains and losses on AFS securities in Tier 1 capital. Following this 
decision, Hodder et al. (2002) find that banks altered initial portfolio allocations made in the 
period examined by Beatty (1995) to undo their initial over- or under-classification of AFS 
securities. While these studies provide useful insights into the potential effects of fair value 
accounting on investment behavior, the lack of a valid control group prevents these studies 
from controlling for potential time confounding events.  
Based on the above prior literature and bankers’ arguments, we expect that banks would 
classify less investment securities into the AFS category in response to the AOCI filter 
removal. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Banks reduce the amount of investment securities classified in the AFS category 
in response to the removal of the AOCI filter. 
Notwithstanding this, the limited ability to sell securities classified in the HTM category 
combined with the Basel III requirement that banks must hold a certain level of high quality 
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liquid assets might provide disincentives to reduce the relative proportion of investment 
securities in the AFS category. Alternatively, banks might shorten the maturity of their 
investment securities to reduce the sensitivity of regulatory capital to interest rate changes. 
Hence, we formulate the next hypothesis as follows: 
H3: Banks shorten the maturity of the investment portfolio in response to the 
removal of the AOCI filter. 
Finally, we examine whether banks reduce the proportion of risky assets in the AFS 
portfolio. As mentioned above, theoretical studies suggest that under a fair value-based 
regulatory regime, banks have reduced risk-shifting incentives as compared to a historical 
cost system (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Lu et al., 2012). Specifically, anticipating that ex 
post realizations of risk are more likely to lead to a transfer of control to the regulator, when 
regulatory capital is based on fair values, managers have lower ex ante risk-taking incentives. 
We test this prediction by analyzing whether banks reduce the proportion of illiquid Level 3 
AFS assets in response to the AOCI filter removal. We examine illiquid securities, 
comprising primarily structured financial products such as collateralized debt obligations and 
non-agency mortgage backed securities, because they represent the riskiest investments in the 
AFS portfolio. The fair values of these investments are volatile and often carry unrealized 
losses that have not been considered in the calculation of regulatory capital under previous 
regulations. Thus, the removal of the AOCI filter likely provides incentives for banks to 
reduce the proportion of illiquid assets, because it would force banks to recognize future 
volatility in regulatory capital. Hence, we formulate our final hypothesis as follows: 
H4: Banks decrease the proportion of illiquid investment securities held in the AFS 




4. Sample Selection 
For our event study analysis, the sample period extends from the second quarter of 2010 
to the third quarter of 2013 during which the previously discussed events occurred. We 
identify 1,088 U.S. banks on SNL Financial. We drop banks for which Tier 1 capital data is 
not available throughout the whole sample period (371 banks), market data is not available on 
CRSP23 (402 banks), and banks with average total assets less than $500 million, for which 
Basel III does not apply (50 banks). Thus, our final sample for this analysis consists of 265 
banks. We supplement our sample with 82 insurance companies through SNL Financial for 
which market data on CRSP is available. Due to missing data required to calculate the 
variables used in the cross-sectional analysis, our sample drops to 232 banks for this analysis.  
The sample period for our investment analysis extends from the first quarter of 2009, one 
quarter before FSP FAS 115-2 and 124-2 became effective, to the third quarter of 2014, three 
quarters after the implementation date of the Final Rule for advanced approaches banks, 
January 1st, 2014.24 For this analysis, we use the same sample of firms used in the cross-
sectional analysis (232 banks) and add 27 small banks (total assets less than $500 million), for 
which Basel III regulations do not apply, yielding a total sample of 259 banks. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Capital market reactions 
5.1.1. Overall capital market reactions 
To study the overall market reaction to the news about the AOCI filter removal, we 
examine three-day windows around the events identified in Table 1. These windows cover the 
period from one day before to one day after the news reaches the market. Moreover, to 
                                                 
23  The majority of these banks are traded on the OTC market. 
24  For non-advanced approaches banks the implementation date is January 1, 2015. 
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disentangle market reaction to news about the AOCI filter removal from confounding news 
and other macro effects, we augment our sample with 82 insurance firms. Since the AOCI 
filter removal applies only to banks, we do not expect significant market reactions (in the 
predicted direction) to related news for insurance firms. Similar to Beatty et al. (1996), we 
estimate the following regression model: 
         (Eq. 1) 
where Retit refers to daily returns including dividends for bank i and time t, Market_Rtnt refers 
to the CRSP value weighted market return, and 5YR_Bond_Rtnt refers to the return on a 5 
Year Treasury Bill. Signed_Events is an indicator variable that takes the value of +1 (-1) for 
events that indicate a decrease (increase) in the likelihood of AOCI filter removal, and 0 
otherwise. Table 2 provides details of the sample distribution and descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in this analysis. 
<<Insert Table 2 around here>> 
In line with our first hypothesis the results presented in Panel A of Table 3 indicate a 
significantly positive coefficient on Signed_Events (at the 1% level) for banks, but not for 
insurance companies. Importantly, the Signed_Events coefficient for banks is significantly 
different from that of insurance companies at the 5% level, mitigating the concern that the 
result for banks is due to confounding news affecting the financial industry. To increase the 
power of our analysis and to mitigate potential event date misspecification, we also conduct a 
test where we consider only a subgroup of regulatory events that are presumably more 
important to banks. Specifically, we replace Signed_Events in Eq. 1 with Signed_Reg, which 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of +1 (-1) for events related to announcements of 
the Bank for International Settlements and the Federal Reserve (i.e., Events 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 
ittititii EventsSignedRtnBondYRRtnMarket εδγβα ++++= ___5_Retit
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12). Again, we find a significantly positive coefficient on Signed_Reg (at the 1% level) for 
banks but not for insurance companies. The difference in coefficients on Signed_Reg between 
banks and insurance companies is statistically significant at the 1% level. Taken together, the 
results suggest that market participants positively (negatively) viewed news that decreased 
(increased) the likelihood of AOCI filter removal. Hence, investors perceive the costs 
associated with the regulatory change to exceed possible benefits from improved regulatory 
discipline.  
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
The previous analysis indicates that, on average, there was a positive market reaction to 
news events that decreased the likelihood of AOCI filter removal. Nonetheless, as different 
events may differ in their market relevance, we next include an indicator variable for each 
individual event in the regression:  
(Eq. 2) 
where δik measures the effect of event k (k = 1, 2, 3, ... K) on bank i and K is the total number 
of events, i.e., 12. 
Table 4 indicates that four of the events elicited a market reaction for banks that was 
significantly different (at the 1% level) from insurance companies in the predicted direction.25 
We find significant negative abnormal returns for Event_2 and Event_4, and significant 
positive market reactions for Event_10 and Event_12. Event_2 relates to the publication of the 
revised Basel III regulations by the Bank of International Settlements that confirmed the 
AOCI filter removal. Event_4 relates to the announcement that the Federal Reserve Board 
                                                 










extended the comment period on the three proposed capital rules until October 22, 2012. On 
Event_10, the Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo admitted in his testimony in front of 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs that banking agencies 
were aware of the strong opposition to the proposed rules, particularly to the removal of the 
AOCI filter. Finally, Event_12 relates to the publication of the Final Rule, which provided the 
opt-out option from the AOCI filter removal for non-advanced approaches banks.  
To control for other bank-specific confounding events, we perform an additional test, in 
which we compare advanced approaches banks to non-advanced approaches banks. In 
particular, if our interpretation of the market reaction for Event_12 is correct, we should 
observe a positive market reaction for non-advanced approaches banks and a negative or no 
market reaction for advanced approaches banks. In line with this expectation, in untabulated 
results we find that while the market reaction for this event for non-advanced approaches 
banks is positive (coefficient = 0.0054) and significant at the 1% level, the market reaction for 
advanced approaches banks is insignificantly different from zero. Moreover, the difference in 
these market reactions is significant at the 5% level. 
In interpreting the economic significance of the results reported in Tables 3 and 4, it is 
important to note that the individual event returns reflect the average return during the event 
window. To calculate the overall sample abnormal return for each event one needs to multiply 
the reported coefficients by the length of the event window (three days). Similarly, the 
coefficient on Signed_Events reflects the average abnormal return over a 36-day event period 
(i.e., 12 events with a three-day event window). Thus, the overall sample abnormal return is 
around 5% (=0.0014*36). The Signed_Reg event results reflect the average over an 18-day 
event period resulting in an overall sample abnormal return on regulatory events of around 
3.4% (=0.0019*18).  
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<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
5.1.2. Cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns 
To mitigate the concern that average market reactions are driven by other aspects of the 
Final Rule rather than the AOCI filter removal, we examine whether market reactions vary 
cross-sectionally with AFS portfolio characteristics. First, we expect that the impact of the 
rule change will increase with the size of the AFS portfolio. We measure AFS as the 
amortized cost of AFS securities divided by total assets averaged over the sample period.26 
Second, we predict that the expected effects of the rule change will depend on the interest rate 
sensitivity of AFS securities, which increases with their duration. Following Beatty et al. 
(1996), we proxy for duration using Maturity measured as total debt securities maturing in 
three years or more divided by the total value of debt securities averaged over the sample 
period.27 In addition, we include a variable capturing the sensitivity of the firm’s equity value 
to changes in interest rates. Exposure is the coefficient on the change in U.S. Federal Funds 
Rate in a regression of bank stock returns on market return and change in U.S. Federal Funds 
Rate.28 To capture the one-time effect of the rule change on the level of regulatory capital, we 
use URGL, which is calculated as the amount of unrealized fair value gains and losses on 
securities recognized in equity divided by total assets averaged over the sample period. Since 
URGL is primarily determined by changes in interest rates, this variable also serves as a proxy 
for the interest rate sensitivity of banks’ AFS portfolios. We expect a positive association 
between Maturity, Exposure, URGL, and the magnitude of abnormal returns.  
                                                 
26  In this analysis the sample period extends from the second quarter of 2010 and ends in the third quarter of 
2013. 
27   We recognize that Maturity is a crude measure of the interest rate sensitivity of floating rate securities. 
However, data on banks’ relative amounts of fixed versus floating rate securities split by maturity is not 
available.  
28  The market return used is the daily CRSP value-weighted return including dividends, while the change in 
U.S. Federal Funds Rate is calculated as U.S.Federal Funds Ratet−U.S.Federal Funds Ratet−1
U.S.Federal Funds Ratet−1 .  
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We also control for illiquidity risk in the bank’s AFS portfolio by including Level3AFS 
measured as the dollar value of Level 3 AFS securities scaled by the amortized cost of AFS 
securities. Ex-ante the direction of the association between Level3AFS and the magnitude of 
abnormal returns is unclear, since bank risk taking might create as well as destroy value for 
shareholders.  
Given that increased capital volatility is likely to be more problematic for banks with 
relatively low levels of regulatory capital, we include Tier1 in our model, which is computed 
as Tier 1 capital scaled by total assets calculated over the sample period. A negative 
association with the magnitude of abnormal returns is expected. We also include volatility of 
Tier 1 capital, Vola_Tier1, computed as the standard deviation of Tier 1 over the sample 
period scaled by the mean Tier 1 capital. Banks with a greater volatility of Tier 1 capital 
before the rule change are expected to be affected more by the inclusion of AOCI in 
regulatory capital. We also control for Debt, measured as non-deposit liabilities divided by 
total assets, and Size, measured as the logarithm of total assets, to allow stock returns to vary 
by bank size. We do not make predictions about the relationship of these variables with 
abnormal returns. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of the variables of interest for the 232 
banks in our sample.  
<<Insert Table 5 around here>> 
To examine the cross-sectional determinants of event period reactions, we undertake two 
separate analyses. The first analysis involves a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we run 
Eq. 1 for each individual bank, and in the second stage we regress the bank-specific 






The second analysis is based on the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) methodology, which 
gives similar coefficients to the two-stage procedure in the first analysis but adjusts standard 
errors for heteroskedasticity and residual cross-correlation that arises when events impact all 
sampled firms at the same time. Specifically, we create 10 weighted portfolio returns, one for 
each firm characteristic studied and the intercept, which are then used as the dependent 
variables in Eq. 1. To create the weighted portfolio of returns we create two matrices: Martix 
R is a t x j matrix, where t is the number of time periods in our sample period (i.e., 881 
trading days) and j the number of firms (i.e., 232 banks), and Matrix F is a j x k matrix, where 
k consists of the different firm characteristics plus the intercept. Finally, the weighted 
portfolio of returns is calculated as (F´F)-1F´R´. 
The results of the cross-sectional analysis are reported in Table 6. In Panel A, URGL and 
Tier 1 show the predicted signs and are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively, suggesting that market reactions are stronger for banks with larger net unrealized 
gains and lower Tier 1 capital. When we use the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) methodology, 
only the coefficient on URGL remains significant (Table 6 Panel B). Hence, banks with the 
largest amount of net unrealized gains are expected to be affected most by the inclusion of 
AOCI items in regulatory capital. Specifically, these banks are the ones that benefited most 
from the low interest rate environment in past years and are likely to be worse off in a period 
of increasing interest rates.29 Importantly, these results buttress the notion that concerns over 
                                                 
29  Indeed, in unreported descriptive analyses we find that sample banks that were in the top quartile in terms of 
unrealized gains in the Q3 2012, when interest rates were low, experienced the largest unrealized losses in 















the removal of the AOCI filter are the primary driver of the market reactions observed in the 
previous section. 
Our previous analyses are based on the premise that the AOCI effects captured by net 
unrealized gains (URGL) are orthogonal to any other changes in banking regulations and that 
absent the AOCI filter removal daily stock returns are unrelated to URGL (and the other 
cross-sectional variables). However, it is possible that our findings are the result of test 
misspecification or some omitted variable correlated with net unrealized gains (e.g., Larcker 
et al., 2011). For example, the positive correlation between net unrealized gains and stock 
returns might be due to a general trend stemming from the gradual recovery of market values 
of AFS securities during our sample period. In this case we would expect net unrealized gains 
to be related to returns even on non-event days.  
To address this concern, we perform a bootstrapping analysis where 12 three-day non-
event time windows were randomly selected. In randomly selecting these 12 three-day non-
event windows we mimic the year-by-year distribution and the signs of our events from Q2 
2010 to Q3 2013. That is, we select one, one, seven, and three non-event windows in 2010, 
2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively, and we sign them according to the pattern displayed in 
Table 1. Using these 12 non-event windows, we run Eq. (1) for each bank in our sample. 
Then, we use the bank-specific coefficients on the Signed_Events variable in Eq. (1) as the 
dependent variables for the cross-sectional model, Eq. (3). We repeat this procedure 1,000 
times to obtain the empirical distribution of one thousand non-event coefficients for each 
variable. Similar to Larcker et al. (2011), we test whether the coefficients for our event days 
(reported in Table 6 Panel A) are significantly different from the average of one thousand 
estimated coefficients for the non-event days. This approach allows us to rule out that the 
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observed relationship between net unrealized gains and abnormal returns is a general 
phenomenon and not related to the removal of the AOCI filter.  
Table 6 Panel C shows the results of our bootstrapping analysis. For each independent 
variable used in the cross-sectional analysis we tabulate the coefficients from the event date 
regression (β) as shown in Table 6 Panel A and the average coefficients resulting from 
repeating the same regression 1,000 times on non-event dates (E(β)). We conduct t-tests for 
the differences between β and E(β) using the empirical distribution of βs  on non-event days 
to compute the standard error of E(β). We find that these differences are significant at the 1% 
level.30 In particular, the average coefficient on URGL on non-event days (0.027) is 
significantly smaller than the coefficient for our events (0.294). This result suggests that the 
observed variation in returns is unique to our event days and, therefore, is likely to be driven 
by the AOCI filter removal rather than the result of test misspecification or omitted correlated 
variables. 
<<Insert Table 6 around here>> 
5.2. Changes in investment behavior 
In this section we study whether banks adjust their investment strategy in response to the 
new regulations. Figure 1 highlights the specific features of our empirical strategy to isolate 
the effects of the AOCI filter removal on banks’ investment behavior. We divide the sample 
period into three separate time periods. The Pre-Proposal period extends from Q1 2009 to Q2 
2012, when the Proposal was issued (June 2012). The Proposal period begins in Q2 2012 and 
                                                 
30  The significantly larger t-statistics in the bootstrapping analysis are due to the generally small standard 
deviation of E(β)s and the higher degrees of freedom that result in much smaller standard errors of the E(β)s 
than the standard errors of the βs in Table 6, Panels A and B. 
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ends in Q2 2013, just before the Final Rule was announced (July 2013).31 The Final Rule 
period starts in Q3 2013 and ends in Q3 2014. Further, we include three groups of banks that 
are differently affected by this regulatory change. Specifically, in addition to advanced 
approaches and non-advanced approaches banks, we supplement our sample of 232 banks 
with 27 small banks (total assets less than $500 million) that are not subject to the new U.S. 
Basel III regulation (hereafter referred to as “Non-Basel” banks). Since the Proposal 
suggested the AOCI filter removal for all banks subject to Basel III rules, we can examine 
whether the Proposal affected their investment behavior relative to the unaffected Non-Basel 
banks. Second, because the Final Rule limited the mandatory removal of the AOCI filter to 
advanced approaches banks, we can benchmark their behavior against that of non-advanced 
approaches and Non-Basel banks in the Final Rule period. Thus, our setting provides us with 
an opportunity to identify the impact of particular amendments to prudential regulation on 




where Investment refers to the investment policy variables described below. Proposal takes a 
value of 1 for observations in the period between the issuance of the Proposal and the 
publication of the Final Rule, and 0 otherwise. Final_Rule takes a value of 1 for observations 
after the Final Rule was issued, and 0 otherwise. NonAdvApproach (AdvApproach) takes the 
value of 1 for non-advanced approaches (advanced approaches) banks, and 0 otherwise. The 
                                                 
31  Unlike market participants who immediately react to any changes in expectations, bank managers decide to 
make costly changes in their investment behavior only when there is a reasonably large probability of the 
regulatory change being implemented (Gulen and Ion, 2015). We take the announcement of the Proposal as 

















interaction terms capture the incremental impact of the Proposal and Final Rule on the 
investment behavior of non-advanced approaches (NonAdvApproach) and advanced 
approaches banks (AdvApproach), respectively, relative to Non-Basel banks. We include 
quarterly unrealized gains and losses URGL, Size, Tier 1 ratio (Tier1), and Debt as control 
variables. In addition, we control for return on assets (ROA) and deposits scaled by total 
assets (Deposits). We include quarter-year fixed effects and firm fixed effects to control for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity in investment behavior. The differences-in-differences design 
and the inclusion of quarter-year fixed effects allow us to control for common trends in 
investment behavior of banks that are unrelated to the AOCI filter removal such as changes in 
market liquidity. Finally, we cluster standard errors at the bank level. 
We construct the following investment policy variables. First, to measure the maturity of 
investment securities we follow Beatty (1995) and calculate the weighted maturity of the 
investment portfolio Weighted_Sec as ((Debt Securities with maturity 3-5 years/total 
securities)*3 + (Debt Securities with maturity 5-15 years/total securities)*5 + (Debt Securities 
with maturity >15 years/total securities)*15). The weightings are based on the arbitrary 
assumption that the average maturity in a given maturity bucket is 3, 5, and 15 years, 
respectively.32 Ideally, we would use the specific maturity of AFS securities, but we do not 
have such data. However, because debt securities are primarily classified in AFS, this is 
unlikely to significantly affect our results. To capture changes in the proportion of investment 
securities that are classified as AFS, we construct AFS_Sec as the amortized cost value of 
AFS securities divided by the amortized cost of total investment securities, where total 
investment securities is the sum of AFS and HTM securities. Finally, to measure the 
proportion of illiquid assets in banks’ AFS portfolios, we calculate Level3AFS as the amount 
                                                 
32  Our results are not sensitive to variations of these weightings. Also, we ran our analysis using total debt 
securities with maturities longer than 3 years scaled by total securities as an alternative maturity measure, and 
we obtain similar results. 
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of Level 3 fair valued assets, i.e., those that are measured at fair value using unobservable 
inputs, divided by the amortized cost value of all AFS securities. 
<<Insert Table 7 around here>> 
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics for the variables of interest for our pooled sample of 
Non-Basel, NonAdvApproach, and AdvApproach banks for the three sub-periods separately. 
The mean relative proportion of AFS securities (AFS_Sec) decreased from 91.2% in the Pre-
Proposal period to 89.2% in the Proposal period, and further down to 85.3% following the 
publication of the Final Rule. While changes in the median AFS_Sec are miniscule, the more 
significant drop in the 25th percentile values suggest that some banks decreased the proportion 
of their investment securities classified as AFS, i.e., classified more securities into HTM, both 
in the Proposal and in the Final Rule periods. However, it is evident from these figures that 
the significance of the HTM category is minor for most banks. The mean weighted maturity 
of securities (Weighted_Sec) increased from 1.75 years in the period before the Proposal date 
to 1.96 years in the period after the issuance of the Final Rule, indicating that banks were 
generally increasing the maturity of investment securities. The proportion of AFS Level 3 
assets (Level3_AFS) decreased, on average, from 2.9% to 2.1% in the Proposal period and 
2.0% in the Final Rule period. Consistent with the interest rate sensitivity of AFS 
investments, unrealized gains and losses (URGL) increase slightly from the Pre-Proposal to 
the Proposal period, when interest rates decrease, and then they drop to become negative in 
the Final Rule period, when interest rates start to increase. 
Table 8 presents the results for the analysis of banks’ investment behavior. Results in 
Table 8 do not suggest that banks that would have been affected by the removal of the AOCI 
filter reduce the maturity of investment securities in the Proposal or the Final Rule periods. 
Regarding the classification of investment securities (AFS_Sec), we observe negative 
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coefficients on the interaction terms only for advanced approaches banks (rows 3 and 4), but 
both are statistically insignificant. Overall, these results do not support bankers’ concerns. 
Finally, we turn to the test of hypothesis H4. The results in column (3) of Table 8 suggest 
that both advanced and non-advanced approaches banks significantly reduced the proportion 
of illiquid securities in their AFS portfolio (Level3AFS) by 3.5% and 1.6%, respectively, in 
the Proposal period relative to Non-Basel banks (rows 1 and 3).33 However, in the Final Rule 
period, while advanced approaches banks appear to further decrease their illiquid AFS 
investments (row 4), the interaction term for non-advanced approaches banks is insignificant 
(row 2). This result suggests that non-advanced approaches banks have partially offset the 
initial reduction of Level 3 AFS securities in the Proposal period after they learned that they 
would not be affected by the Final Rule. The Wald tests in rows (5) and (6) indicate that 
advanced approaches banks reduce more of their risky AFS investments than non-advanced 
approaches banks in both the Proposal and the Final Rule period. Taken together, these results 
are consistent with banks decreasing the riskiness of their investment portfolio in anticipation 
of the removal of the AOCI filter. 
<<Insert Table 8 around here>> 
Given that a number of our advanced approaches banks are Global Systemically 
Important Banks, we are concerned that the reduction of illiquid securities might be caused by 
other concurrent factors that these banks face. However, if these other concurrent trends 
affecting advanced approaches banks are the main drivers of our findings, then we should also 
observe a more pronounced decrease in illiquid securities in other fair value accounting 
categories. To test this, we analyze the change in the size of Level 3 securities held in the 
                                                 
33  The decrease in Level3AFS represents about 54% (67%) of the sample period average for advanced (non-
advanced) approaches banks, which is 6.4% (2.4%). 
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trading portfolio of banks around the Proposal and Final rule dates. We rerun Eq. 4 using the 
proportion of Level 3 trading securities relative to total trading securities (Level3Trading) as 
the dependent variable. Because Non-Basel banks only rarely have trading assets, for this 
analysis we only benchmark AdvApproach against NonAdvApproach banks. Results in Table 
9 show that AdvApproach banks do not exhibit a more significant reduction in Level 3 trading 
securities than NonAdvApproach banks. This finding supports our interpretation that the 
reduction of illiquid AFS securities of AdvApproach banks is driven by the removal of the 
AOCI filter rather than by other concurrent factors affecting these banks. 
<<Insert Table 9 around here>> 
Further, to mitigate the concern that the results reported in Table 8 are merely driven by 
the return of market liquidity over the sample period, we examine whether banks actually 
change their real investment decisions involving illiquid AFS securities. To this end, we 
hand-collect data from banks’ disclosures of Level 3 rollforwards that allow us to distinguish 
purchases and sales of Level 3 AFS securities from transfers of these securities to other levels. 
We limit our analysis to the eight advanced approaches banks that are affected by the 
mandatory AOCI filter removal under the Final Rule and the ten largest non-advanced 
approaches banks. By comparing only the largest banks we mitigate a potential concern in our 
main analysis associated with using smaller banks as control banks, as they are inherently 
different, which might undermine their effectiveness as a control group (Beatty and Liao, 
2014). Also, the largest banks are more likely to have expected that they would be subjected 
to the AOCI filter removal under the Final Rule after the Proposal came out. The sample 
period for this analysis starts in the first quarter of 2011, because separate disclosures 
regarding purchases, sales, issuances, and settlements for Level 3 assets are available only 
from then, and ends in the third quarter of 2014.  
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Figure 2, Panels A and B show the total amount of net purchases (i.e., the net amount of 
purchases and sales) of Level 3 AFS securities for advanced approaches and non-advanced 
approaches banks, respectively. Both subsamples appear to have gradually increased their 
Level 3 net investment in the Pre-Proposal period. For example, advanced approaches banks 
invested a total of approximately $19 billion in illiquid securities in the third quarter of 2011, 
while non-advanced approaches banks’ net investments amounted to almost $2 billion in the 
first quarter of 2012. Following the issuance of the Proposal, both subsamples responded with 
a decrease in net purchases. Interestingly, after the announcement of the Final Rule, while 
advanced approaches banks further reduced their net purchases to less than $1bn in Q3 2014, 
non-advanced approaches banks increased their net investment in Level 3 AFS securities. 
These trends are consistent with our primary findings reported in Table 8. 
Table 10 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for net purchases and net transfers to other 
fair value levels scaled by the amortized cost of AFS securities. The changes in net purchases 
of Level 3 securities across the three periods for both subsamples are similar to those 
observed in Figure 2. However, the table highlights that while the initial reduction in Level 3 
net investments of non-advanced approaches is driven by sales in the Proposal period, 
advanced approaches banks primarily responded with reductions in new purchases in both the 
Proposal and Final Rule periods. All banks, on average, seem to have transferred assets from 
Level 3 to other levels, suggesting that return of market liquidity might partially contribute to 
our primary results. Advanced approaches banks exhibit larger transfers out of Level 3 in the 
Pre-Proposal and Proposal periods, but non-advanced approaches banks catch up in the Final 
Rule period. In Table 10 Panel B we report regression results for net purchases and net 
transfers as dependent variables.34 Model (1) shows that both groups of banks decrease net 
                                                 
34   Because of the small sample size (and firm clusters), we do not include quarter-year effects and do not cluster 
standard errors by bank (Petersen, 2009). However, the inclusion of Proposal and Final Rule control for time-
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purchases of Level 3 securities in the Proposal period, but this result is not significant, which 
might be due to low statistical power. However, in the Final Rule period, advanced 
approaches banks significantly decreased net AFS Level 3 investments, while non-advanced 
approaches banks significantly increased their Level 3 net investments. Finally, model (2) 
does not suggest that net transfers out of Level 3 were significantly different across the three 
periods and bank groups. Overall, these results confirm our primary findings in Table 8 and 
support the conclusion that the removal of the AOCI filter influenced real managerial 
investment decisions. 
<<Insert Table 10 around here>> 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the consequences of the AOCI filter removal, which requires 
the inclusion of unrealized fair value gains and losses on AFS securities in regulatory capital. 
In line with the hypothesis that the inclusion of unrealized gains and losses will result in 
increased regulatory costs, we find negative (positive) stock market reactions to news 
indicating an increased (decreased) likelihood of the AOCI filter removal. Further analysis 
shows that these market reactions are mainly driven by the relative magnitude of unrealized 
fair value gains and losses on AFS securities.  
We do not find evidence that banks affected by the AOCI filter removal (i.e., advanced 
approaches banks) reduce the maturity of their investment portfolio or the proportion of AFS 
securities relative to benchmark banks. In contrast, our results suggest that affected banks 
reduce their investment in risky, illiquid Level 3 investment securities more than unaffected 
banks. The latter finding is consistent with theoretical predictions that basing regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                        
period effects. In addition, we include the return on 10-year Treasury Bills (10YR_Bond_Rtn) as a control 
variable for changes in interest rates. Inferences are similar when we include quarter-year fixed effects. 
Finally, we do not include the control variable Weighted_Sec, because it further reduces sample size. 
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capital on fair values mitigates ex ante risk-shifting incentives of bank managers (Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1994; Lu et al., 2012) and, therefore, improves regulatory discipline. 
Notwithstanding this, our study cannot speak to the ex post efficiency of fair value-based 
capital requirements, so we leave this for future research.  
In interpreting our findings, several caveats are in order. First, our analysis of stock 
market reactions does not (and is not intended to) capture all costs and benefits associated 
with the removal of the AOCI filter. As mentioned earlier, our results primarily reflect the 
private costs and benefits and any social costs and benefits internalized by bank shareholders. 
Second, while our research design for the capital market and investment behavior analyses 
mitigates concerns about omitted correlated variables and alternative explanations, we cannot 
entirely rule out that other changes in bank regulation play into our findings. Notwithstanding 
these caveats, we believe that the collective evidence provided by the different sets of tests 
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Figure 2: Net Purchases of Level 3 AFS securities 
 
Panel A: Advanced Approaches Banks 
 
 
Panel B: Non-Advanced Approaches Banks 
 
 
The figure illustrates time-series variation in net purchases for advanced approaches banks (Panel A) and 
non-advanced approaches banks (Panel B) over the three different time periods. The blue bars indicate the 
quarterly total net purchases summed over all banks in the given group (in million US$), while the lines 
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Table 1:  
Announcements concerning the removal of the AOCI filter 
 
Event 
No. Date Source Headline/Description of article/announcement 
Increase (I)/  
Decrease (D)* 
1 December 16, 2010 Bank for International Settlements 
Basel III rules text and results of the qualitative impact study issued by the Basel 
Committee 
The Basel Committee issued details of the global regulatory standards on bank capital 
adequacy and liquidity. 
I 
2 June 1, 2011 Bank for International Settlements 
Capital treatment for bilateral counterparty credit risk finalized by the Basel 
Committee 
The Basel Committee announced that it had completed a review and finalized the Basel 
III capital treatment for counterparty credit risk in bilateral trades. 
I 
3 June 7, 2012 Federal Reserve Newswire 
 
Federal Reserve Board invites comment on three proposed rules intended to help 
ensure banks maintain strong capital positions 
Issue of Notice of Proposed Rule Making to remove the AOCI filter and invitation for 
comment 
I 
4 August 8, 2012 Federal Reserve Newswire 
Federal Reserve Board extends comment period on three proposed capital rules 
rulemakings until October 22, 2012 
Extension of comment period to allow interested persons more time to understand, 
evaluate and prepare comments on the proposals 
I 
5 August 10, 2012 SNL Financial 
Window of opportunity widens for banks to comment on Basel III 
Commenting on extension of comment period and that various organizations are 
against removal of AOCI filter 
D 
6 October 24, 2012 SNL Financial 
 
OCC will take a  'very serious look' at Basel III impact on community banks  
Possible exemption of community banks from Basel III proposals 
D 
7 November 9, 2012 Federal Reserve Newswire 
Agencies provide guidance on regulatory capital rulemakings 
Delay in rule making process, which process would not be completed by January 1, 
2013. 
I 
8 November 13, 2012 Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal** Ignorance isn't bliss for banks  Expressed concern by small banks about the impact of Basel III rules - Independent 




9 November 20, 2012 SNL Financial 
 
Another insurer-owned bank seeks Shelter from oncoming regulatory storm 
Impact of Basel III on insurance owned banks 
D 
10 February 18, 2013 SNL Financial 
Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo  to discuss proposed capital rules, shadow 
banking in Senate hearing 
Tarullo to discuss AOCI filter in Senate hearing 
D 
11 March 18, 2013 SNL Financial 
ICBA's chairman-elect says community bankers are fighters, will find a way 
AOCI will affect community banks badly - Independent Community Bankers of 
America 
D 
12 July 2, 2013 Federal Reserve Newswire 
Federal Reserve Board approves final rule to help ensure banks maintain strong 
capital positions 
Final rule issued and approved 
D 
          
* The column lists whether the news in the article/announcement increased (I) or decreased (D) the likelihood that the AOCI filter is removed. 
** The same news item was identified in both the Dow Jones Newswires and the Wall Street Journal. 
 
This table contains the announcement dates used in assessing the share price reaction of banks and insurance companies to news about AOCI filter removal. Event dates 1 
and 2 relate to the publication of the Basel III framework, while the other event dates were gathered from a search of Dow Jones Newswires, Wall Street Journal, 
Bloomberg, SNL Financial, Financial Times, and Federal Reserve Newswire for the term “AOCI filter” for the period January 6, 2012, to  July 31, 2013. Only events 
deemed to convey new information were included in the analysis.  
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Table 2:  
Panel A: Details of the distribution of the sample used in analyzing the market reaction to AOCI 
filter news 
 
     
Banks Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative Frequency Percent 
Non-Advanced Approach 257 96.98 257 96.98 
Advanced Approach 8 3.02 265 100 
          
          
Insurers Frequency Percent  Cumulative Cumulative Frequency Percent 
Insurers with total assets <$250B 78 95.12 78 95.12 
Insurers with total assets >$250B 4 4.88 82 100 
 
 
Panel B: Details of the variables used in analyzing the market reaction to the AOCI filter news 
 
Banks             
              
Variable N 25th Pctl Mean Median 75th Pctl Std Dev 
Rtn 221,865 -0.011 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.029 
Market_Rtn 221,865 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.011 
5YR_Bond_Rtn 221,865 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.010 
  
      Insurers 
        
      Variable N 25th Pctl Mean Median 75th Pctl Std Dev 
Rtn 70,332 -0.009 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.022 
Market_Rtn 70,332 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.011 
5YR_Bond_Rtn 70,332 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.010 
 
Panel A shows details of the distribution of the sample used in analyzing the market reaction to AOCI filter news 
over the period between Q2 2010 and Q3 2013. Advanced approaches banks include banks with mean total assets 
over the sample period greater than $250 billion. Non-advanced approaches banks are those to which Basel III 
applies and total assets are greater than $500 million and less than $250 billion. A sample of 82 insurance companies 
is used as a benchmark for banks’ stock market reaction. Panel B shows descriptive information about the variables 
used in analyzing market reactions to news events related to the AOCI filter removal. Rtn refers to the firm daily 
return including dividends. Market_Rtn refers to the CRSP value weighted. 5YR_Bond_Rtn refers to the return on a 




Table 3:  
Analyses of market reactions to news about the AOCI filter removal  
 






Variable Banks Insurers 
Difference 
  Estimate   t-value Estimate   t-value 
                  
Market_Rtn 0.9488 *** 45.94 1.1712 *** 54.57   
5YR_Bond_Rtn -0.0452 ** -2.56 -0.0181   -1.10   
Signed_Events 0.0014 *** 2.61 0.0000   0.00 0.0014 ** 
Intercept 0.0004 ** 1.96 0.0002   1.33     
                  
R-squared 0.140 0.352     
No. of observations 221,865 70,332   
 





Variable Banks Insurers 
Difference 
  Estimate   t-value Estimate   t-value 
                  
Market_Rtn 0.9485 *** 45.94 1.1712 *** 54.6   
5YR_Bond_Rtn -0.0457 ** -2.59 -0.0175   -1.06   
Signed_Reg 0.0019 *** 2.73 -0.0007   -0.89 0.0026 *** 
Intercept 0.0004 ** 2.11 0.0002   1.25     
                  
R-squared 0.140 0.352     
No. of observations 221,865 70,332   
 
This table shows the results of analyses of market reactions to news events about the AOCI filter removal. Panel A 
shows the results for an analysis including all news events identified in Table 1, while Panel B shows the results for 
regulatory news events only. Market_Rtn is the CRSP value weighted return; 5YR_Bond_Rtn is the return on the 5-
year Treasury bill; Signed_Events is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for event windows around events 
that decrease the probability of AOCI filter removal, takes the value of -1 for event windows around events that 
increase the likelihood that the AOCI filter is removed, and 0 otherwise; and Signed_Reg is computed similar to 
Signed_Events but for regulatory news events (Events 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 12) only. Event windows start one day before 
and end one day after the event date. The sample consists of daily market data for the period Q2 2010 to Q3 2013, 
comprising 265 banks and 82 insurance firms. Difference shows the results of a chi-squared test for differences in 
coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by date. *, **, and *** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. 
 
ittititii gSignedRtnBondYRRtnMarket εδγβα ++++= Re___5_Ret it
ittititii EventsSignedRtnBondYRRtnMarket εδγβα ++++= ___5_Retit
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Table 4:  










    Estimate  t-value Estimate  t-value 
                      
Market_Rtn   0.9488 *** 45.71  1.1718 *** 54.27    
5YR_Bond_Rtn   -0.0441 ** -2.45  -0.0180  -1.07    
Event_1 - -0.0010  -0.67  -0.0008  -0.61  -0.0002  
Event_2 - -0.0021 * -1.86  0.0018 ** 2.18  -0.0039 *** 
Event_3 - -0.0017  -0.76  0.0002  0.08  -0.0019 
 Event_4 - -0.0010  -1.12  0.0012 *** 2.72  -0.0022 *** 
Event_5 + -0.0008  -0.36  -0.0001  -0.04  -0.0007 
 Event_6 + 0.0040 *** 3.28  0.0034 *** 4.52  0.0006 
 Event_7 - 0.0013 * 1.85  0.0026 ** 2.1  -0.0013 
 Event_8 + -0.0025 * -1.89  -0.0023  -1.06  -0.0002 
 Event_9 + -0.0001  -0.27  0.0003  0.12  -0.0004 
 Event_10 + 0.0029 ** 2.12  -0.0007  -0.43  0.0036 *** 
Event_11 + 0.0013 * 1.86  0.0014 *** 6.08  -0.0001 
 Event_12 + 0.0052 *** 4.23  0.0001  0.03 
 
0.0051 *** 
Intercept   0.0004 * 1.82  0.0002  1.13 
       
 
 
   
 
    R-squared    0.140  0.353     
No. of observations    221,865  70,332     
 
This table shows the results of the regression of bank and insurance stock returns, respectively, on the CRSP value 
weighted market return (Market_Rtn), the return on 5-year Treasury bill (5YR_Bond_Rtn), and event indicator 
variables (Event_1 - Event_12). The sample consists of daily market data for the period Q2 2010 to Q3 2013, 
comprising 265 banks and 82 insurance firms. Event_1 - Event_12 refer to news events relevant to the AOCI filter 
removal and are described in Table 1. Event_1 - Event_12 take the value of 1 on the 3-day event windows around 
the date when the actual event takes place, and 0 otherwise. Difference shows the results of a chi-squared test for 
differences in coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by date. *, **, and *** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% 









Table 5:  
Descriptive statistics for all banks in the cross-sectional analysis 
 
 
Variable N 25th Pctl Mean Median 75th Pctl Std Dev 
AFS 232 0.118 0.189 0.170 0.247 0.099 
Maturity 232 0.149 0.282 0.252 0.377 0.188 
Exposure 232 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.008 
URGL 232 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Level3AFS 232 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.007 0.035 
Tier1 232 0.086 0.099 0.096 0.108 0.022 
Vola_Tier1 232 0.047 0.098 0.074 0.113 0.081 
Debt 232 0.193 0.257 0.248 0.308 0.096 
Size 232 13.938 15.100 14.700 15.785 1.643 
 
 
The sample comprises 232 banks with stock return and financial statement data available on CRSP and SNL Financial, respectively. The table shows descriptive statistics for 
the variables used in both the two-stage cross-sectional regression and the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) methodology. All variables are the means for the quarterly 
observations for each sample firm over the period from Q2 2010 to Q3 2013. AFS is the amortized cost value of AFS securities scaled by total assets. Maturity is total debt 
securities with maturity longer than 3 years scaled by total securities. Exposure is the coefficient on change in U.S. Federal Funds Rate in a regression of bank stock returns on 
market return and change in U.S. Federal Funds Rate. URGL is calculated as net unrealized gains scaled by total assets. Level3AFS is the dollar value of Level 3 AFS 
securities scaled by the amortized cost value of AFS securities. Tier1 is Tier 1 capital scaled by total assets. Vola_Tier1 is the standard deviation coefficient calculated as the 




Table 6:  
Panel A: Results of the two-stage cross-sectional regression 
 
Variable Expected Sign Signed_Events 
   Estimate   t-value 
         
AFS + -0.004  -1.64 
Maturity + 0.001  0.9 
Exposure + 0.040  1.64 
URGL + 0.294 *** 2.83 
Level3AFS ? 0.000  -0.02 
Tier1 - -0.024 ** -2.59 
Vola_Tier1 + 0.003  1.15 
Debt ? 0.000  0.11 
Size ? 0.000  -0.87 
Intercept  0.005 * 1.89 
         
R-squared  0.094 
No. of observations  232 
 
Panel B: Results of the Sefcik & Thompson (1986) methodology 
 
Variable Expected Sign 
Signed_Events 
Estimate   t-value 
         
AFS + -0.004  -1.21 
Maturity + 0.001  0.62 
Exposure + 0.040  0.67 
URGL + 0.294 * 1.65 
Level3AFS ? 0.000  -0.02 
Tier1 - -0.024  -1.43 
Vola_Tier1 + 0.003  0.44 
Debt ? 0.000  0.08 
Size ? 0.000  -0.37 
Intercept  0.005  0.84 
         









Panel C: Bootstrapping analysis 
 
     
Variable Expected Sign  [β- E(β)] β   E(β) 
         
AFS + -0.004   0.001 
               [-36.52]*** 
Maturity + 0.001   0.000 
               [28.60]*** 
Exposure + 0.040   0.004 
                [24.50]*** 
URGL + 0.294   0.027 
                [52.68]*** 
Level3AFS ? 0.000   0.001 
               [-4.51]*** 
Tier1 - -0.024   0.003 
                  [-66.18]*** 
Vola_Tier1 + 0.003   0.000 
                 [16.14]*** 
Debt ? 0.000   0.000 
                [5.65]*** 
Size ? 0.005   0.000 
                 [-18.53]*** 
     
 
Panel A shows the results of the two-stage cross-sectional regression, where the dependent variable is the coefficient 
on Signed_Events that is obtained from firm-specific regressions of bank stock returns on the value weighted market 
return, 5-year Treasury bill return, and the Signed_Events indicator. Panel B shows the results of the Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986) methodology. In Panel A we have 232 observations as we have one observation for each of the 
sample firms, while in Panel B we have 881 observations, since by construction the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) 
methodology produces weighted returns for each trading day in the sample period (i.e., 881 trading days). 
Independent variables are defined in Table 5. In Panel C we show the result for our bootstrapping analysis where β 
is the estimate from the event date regression (reported in Panel A), and E(β) is the average coefficient resulting 
from repeating the same regression 1000 times for non-event date groups. Each non-event date group consists of 12 
randomly selected three-day, non-event time windows. In randomly selecting these 12 three-day, non-event 
windows, we mimic the year-by-year distribution and the signs of our events from Q2 2010 to Q3 2013. We then 
test whether estimated coefficients for the event days (β) are significantly different from the average of the 1000 
estimated coefficients for the non-event days (E[β]) using the empirical distribution of β on non-event days to 
compute the standard error of E[β]. t-statistics for a (two-tailed) t-test for the null β = E(β) appear in brackets. *, **, 
and *** denote a 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 7:  
Descriptive statistics for the multivariate analysis of banks’ investment behavior 
 
Panel A: Observations for all banks in the Pre-Proposal period  
              
 
Mean p25 p50 p75 sd N 
Dependent variables 
      Weighted_Sec 1.748 0.685 1.346 2.354 1.607 3,384 
AFS_Sec 0.912 0.912 0.998 1.000 0.177 3,384 
Level3AFS 0.029 0.000 0.005 0.032 0.069 1,719 
       Control variables 
      URGL 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 3,384 
Size 14.923 13.740 14.524 15.680 1.683 3,384 
Tier1 0.096 0.084 0.094 0.106 0.025 3,384 
Debt 0.255 0.194 0.244 0.303 0.096 3,384 
Deposits 0.644 0.591 0.652 0.709 0.102 3,384 
ROA 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.005 3,384 
 
 
Panel B: Observations for all banks in the period after the issue of the Proposal but before the 
issue of the Final Rule 
              
 
Mean p25 p50 p75 sd N 
Dependent variables 
      Weighted_Sec 1.961 0.839 1.493 2.701 1.714 1,006 
AFS_Sec 0.892 0.846 0.999 1.000 0.194 1,006 
Level3AFS 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.020 0.045 540 
       Control variables 
      URGL 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.003 1,006 
Size 14.962 13.809 14.546 15.709 1.691 1,006 
Tier1 0.100 0.087 0.098 0.111 0.024 1,006 
Debt 0.260 0.196 0.258 0.313 0.100 1,006 
Deposits 0.634 0.578 0.637 0.699 0.103 1,006 












Panel C: Observations for all banks in the period after the issue of the Final Rule 
              
 
Mean p25 p50 p75 sd N 
Dependent variables 
      Weighted_Sec 1.961 0.834 1.557 2.756 1.650 1,111 
AFS_Sec 0.853 0.755 0.980 1.000 0.213 1,111 
Level3AFS 0.020 0.000 0.002 0.018 0.048 587 
       Control variables 
      URGL -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 1,111 
Size 15.030 13.827 14.644 15.811 1.714 1,111 
Tier1 0.100 0.088 0.099 0.111 0.022 1,111 
Debt 0.274 0.204 0.272 0.331 0.099 1,111 
Deposits 0.620 0.559 0.621 0.684 0.101 1,111 
ROA 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 1,111 
 
The sample comprises firm-quarter observations for 259 banks, representing eight advanced approaches banks, 224 
non-advanced approaches banks, and 27 Non-Basel banks (total assets <$500 million), for the sample period 
between Q1 2009 and Q3 2014. Weighted_Sec is calculated as ((Debt Securities with maturity 3-5 years/total 
securities)*3+(Debt Securities with maturity 5-15 years/total securities)*5+(Debt Securities with maturity >15 
years/total securities)*15). AFS_Sec is the amortized cost value of AFS securities scaled by the amortized cost value 
of total investment securities (i.e., the sum of available-for-sale and held-to-maturity securities). Level3AFS is the 
fair value of AFS securities that are measured using unobservable inputs scaled by the amortized cost value of AFS 
securities; URGL is unrealized gains and losses scaled by total assets; Size is logarithm of total assets; Tier1 is Tier1 
capital scaled by total assets; Debt is non-deposit liabilities scaled by total assets; Deposits is deposits scaled by total 
assets; ROA is return on assets calculated as net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets.  
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Table 8:  









(1) (2) (3) 
  
Weighted_Sec AFS_Sec Level3AFS 
  
Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. 
Proposal*NonAdvApproach (1) 0.248 0.81 0.010 0.46 -0.016*** -2.67 
Final Rule*NonAdvApproach (2) 0.114 0.37 0.006 0.18 -0.018 -1.60 
Proposal*AdvApproach (3) -0.049 -0.13 -0.039 -0.81 -0.035*** -4.65 
Final Rule*AdvApproach (4) -0.110 -0.25 -0.059 -1.15 -0.049*** -3.32 
F-test for differences [p-value]: 
















        ROA 
 
-4.418 -0.96 0.023 0.05 0.606 0.82 
Deposits 
 
-3.140 -0.83 0.504 1.36 0.057 0.28 
URGL 
 
-33.220** -2.27 4.758*** 3.23 -0.837 -1.03 
Tier 1 Capital 
 
-7.656 -1.59 0.259 0.67 -0.146 -0.62 
Debt 
 
-4.543 -1.19 0.459 1.30 -0.051 -0.28 
Size 
 
-0.327 -1.00 -0.036 -1.29 0.012 0.81 
Weighted_Sec 
   
-0.007* -1.69 -0.003 -0.62 














     













2,846   
 
The sample comprises firm-quarter observations for 259 banks, representing eight advanced approaches banks, 224 
non-advanced approaches banks, and 27 Non-Basel banks (total assets <$500 million), for the sample period 
between Q1 2009 and Q3 2014. Proposal is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firm-quarter 
observations after the proposal was issued but before the issuance of the Final Rule, i.e. from the third quarter of 
2012 to the second quarter of 2013, and 0 otherwise. Final_Rule is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
firm-quarter observations after the Final Rule was published, i.e., from the third quarter of 2013, and 0 otherwise. 
NonAdvApproach is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for non-advanced approaches banks, and 0 
otherwise. AdvApproach is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for advanced approaches banks, and 0 
otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 7. We include firm fixed and quarter-year fixed effects, but do 
not report the coefficients. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level. We also report p-
values from Wald tests assessing the significance of differences in treatment effects. *, ** and *** denote a 10%, 
















Table 9:  
Changes in the proportion of illiquid (Level 3) trading securities 
 




    Proposal*AdvApproach (1) -0.025 -0.71 
Final Rule*AdvApproach (2) -0.045 -0.99 
 
F-test for differences [p-value]: 
   (1) = (2) (3) [0.514] 
 





















    Firm fixed effects 
 
Yes 




    Adjusted R-squared   0.191   
Observations   658   
 
The sample comprises firm-quarter observations for 34 banks, representing eight advanced approaches banks and 26 
non-advanced approaches banks, for the sample period between Q1 2009 and Q3 2014. The sample includes only 
banks that had exposure to Level 3 trading securities during the sample period. The dependent variable 
Level3Trading is calculated as Level 3 trading securities scaled by total trading securities. AdvApproach is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for advanced approaches banks, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are 
defined in Table 7. The analysis includes firm fixed and quarter-year fixed effects. t-statistics are based on standard 
errors clustered at the bank level. We also report p-values from Wald tests assessing the significance of differences 






Table 10:  
Analysis of Level 3 rollforward activity data 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of purchases, sales, and net transfers of Level 3 AFS securities 
 
 
Non-Advanced Approaches Banks 
 
Advanced Approaches Banks 
 
Pre-Proposal Proposal Final Rule 
 
Pre-Proposal Proposal Final Rule 
AFS L3 Purchases 0.0014 0.0012 0.0053 
 
0.0072 0.0039 0.0015 
AFS L3 Sales 0.0015 0.0084 0.0004 
 
0.0012 0.0013 0.0003 
AFS L3 Net Purchases -0.0001 -0.0072 0.0049 
 
0.0060 0.0026 0.0012 











AFS L3 Net Purchases AFS L3 Net Transfers 
  
Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. 
      Proposal (1) -0.008 -0.87 0.001 1.41 
Final Rule (2) 0.009* 1.94 0.001 1.42 
Proposal*AdvApproach (3) 0.003 0.37 -0.003 -1.02 
Final Rule*AdvApproach (4) -0.011*** -2.99 0.002 1.45 
 
F-test for differences [p-value]: 
     (1) = (3) (5) [0.531] 
 
[0.194] 




      ROA 
 
-1.471 -0.84 -0.185 -0.41 
Deposits 
 
0.003 0.02 0.079 1.56 
10YR_Bond_Rtn 
 
-0.002 -0.92 0.000 0.51 
URGL 
 
0.138 0.21 0.149 0.94 
Tier 1 Capital 
 
-0.563 -0.98 -0.211*** -2.86 
Debt 
 
-0.062 -0.34 0.073 1.41 
Size 
 
-0.015 -0.81 -0.011** -2.00 
















 Observations   270 
 
270   
 
The sample comprises firm-quarter observations for 18 banks, representing eight advanced approaches banks and 10 
non-advanced approaches banks for the period between Q1 2011 and Q3 2014. Panel A provides the mean values of 
purchases, sales, and net transfers of Level 3 securities from/into other fair value levels. Panel B reports regression 
results for two dependent variables: (1) AFS L3 Net Purchases and (2) AFS L3 Net Transfers. AFS L3 Purchases is 
quarterly purchases of Level 3 AFS securities scaled by the amortized cost value of total AFS securities. AFS L3 
Sales is quarterly sales of Level 3 AFS securities scaled by the amortized cost value of total AFS securities. AFS L3 
Net Purchases is calculated as AFS L3 Purchases minus AFS L3 Sales. AFS L3 Net Transfers is calculated as 
transfers into minus transfers out of Level 3 AFS securities to other fair value levels. Proposal is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 for firm-quarter observations after the proposal was issued but before the issuance 
of the Final Rule, i.e., from the third quarter of 2012 to the second quarter of 2013, and 0 otherwise. Final_Rule is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firm-quarter observations after the Final Rule was published, i.e., 
from the third quarter of 2013, and 0 otherwise. AdvApproach is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
advanced approaches banks, and 0 otherwise. 10YR_Bond_Rtn is the return on 10-year Treasury bills. All other 
variables are defined in Table 7. Firm fixed effects are included. t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors. We also report p-values from Wald tests assessing the significance of differences in treatment 
effects. *, **, and *** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
